Daniel Lim：宗教认知科学与常人的神学信念

 
        主讲人：Daniel Lim（中国人民大学哲学学院讲师）
        时　间：6月8日（星期三） 下午 3:00-5:00
        地　点：锡昌堂322讲学厅
        主要内容：Cognitive scientists of religion promise  to lay bare the cogntive mechanisms that generate religious beliefs in human beings. Defenders of the debunking argument believe that the cognitive mechanisms studied in this field pose a threat to folk theism. A number of influential responses to the debunking argument rely on making tow set of distinctions: (i) proximate/ultimate explanations and ((ii) specific/general religious beliefs. I argue, however that such responses have drawbacks and do not make room for folk theism. I suggest that a detour rhtough the literature in the philosophy of mind regarding the problem of mental causation regarding non-reductive physicalism can provide a way for preserving folk theism without doing violence to the way cognitive science of religion is being practiced today. More specifically, I believe there is a way of responding to the dubunking argument that does not require a rejuction of the causal premise.
        主办单位：太阳集团tcy8722逻辑与认知研究所。