逸仙逻辑讲坛第二十九期预告｜Marcin Lewiński：One concept of argument

第二十九期   逸仙逻辑讲坛

题目：One concept of argument

主讲人：Marcin Lewiński

新里斯本大学社会科学与人文学院传播学系

主持人：谢耘

太阳集团城娱8722逻辑与认知研究所

时   间：4月15日（周二）上午9:30

地   点：太阳集团tcy8722锡昌堂322室

主办方：太阳集团tcy8722逻辑与认知研究所

           论辩实验室

主讲人简介 

      Marcin Lewiński is Associate Professor in the Argumentation Lab, NOVA Institute of Philosophy, NOVA University Lisbon, Portugal. His research applying philosophical concepts to the study of public argumentation has been published in journals, edited volumes, and special issues. Marcin’s work focuses on the basic issues in the philosophy of language and argumentation theory such as rationality of everyday conversations, practical reasoning, pragmatic meaning, social and strategic aspects of speech acts, conceptual / metalinguistic disputes, and fallacies. His recent monograph (co-authored with Mark Aakhus, Rutgers University) Argumentation in Complex Communication: Managing Disagreement in a Polylogue was published by the Cambridge University Press (2023). He has led several research projects, including COST Action European network for argumentation and public policy analysis (APPLY: 2018-2023), funded by th European Commission. He is the Associate Editor of Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy, reponsible for its “Philosophy of Argument” section.

内容简介 

       What is an argument? This is the question addressed in this lecture.

       Part of the business of argumentation theory involves resolving a conceptual dispute over what argumentation and argument are in the first place. This dispute has produced various “concepts of argument.” The goal of this lecture is twofold: 1) to develop a complete ontology of argumentative phenomena, capable of accounting for various conceptions of argument – something, as I argue, that is badly wanting in argumentation theory; and, within this ontology, 2) to defend a position that there is but one concept of argument needed to grasp these diverse phenomena and conceptions of argument and argumentation.

       I move in four steps. First, I briefly sketch the discussion over arguments-as-activities (argumentation) and arguments-as-products (arguments), with O’Keefe’s paper “Two concepts of argument” (1977) and the pragma-dialectical “process-product ambiguity” (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004) as two key examples. Second, I go back to the classic work of the Polish philosopher Kazimierz Twardowski (1866-1938) “On actions and products” (1912) and adapt it for argumentation theory, producing a complex yet systematically organized conceptual ontology of argument and argumentation. This conceptual housekeeping allows me, third, to critically engage some of the recent, Frege-inspired philosophical literature on the concept of argument, while defending act-based approaches to argument(ation). Fourth, I present a positive proposal of a minimal, contrastivist concept of argument as a set of reasons advanced to support a conclusion C1 rather than another conclusion Cn.